



IN POLITICAL AND 
SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUI Working Paper SPS No. 91/14
The Political Factors Accounting for the 
Relationship Between Governments 
and the Parties Which Support Them
Jean Blondel




























































































N I I I  I III II
3 0 0 0 1  0 0 1 3  5 7 1 9  5
Please note
As from January 1990 the EUI Working Paper Series is 
divided into six sub-series, each sub-series is numbered 


























































































EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE, FLORENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
EUI Working Paper SPS No. 91/14
The Political Factors Accounting for the 
Relationship Between Governments 
and the Parties Which Support Them
Jean Blondel




























































































No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form 
without permission of the author.
© Jean Blondel
Printed in Italy in December 1991 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 




























































































THE POLITICAL FACTORS ACCOUNTING FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GOVERNMENTS AND THE PARTIES WHICH SUPPORT THEM
J. Blondel
In a previous paper, an attempt was made to map out the 
types of relationships existing between governments and the 
parties which support them, at least in competitive and semi- 
competitive political systems (1). These relationships were found 
to develop on three different planes, namely in terms of policy 
initiation and elaboration, of course, but also in terms of the 
composition of the elite, both party and governmental, as well as 
in terms of the distribution of favours and patronage.
Party-government relationships can be analysed by 
reference to two dimensions. One of these reflects the extent to 
which governments and supporting parties are autonomous from each 
other; the other assesses how far dependence relationships are 
characterised by government dominance or by party dominance, with, 
as an intermediate position, equal and reciprocal influence. These 
two dimensions are not independent from each other, of course: 




























































































practice, however, different 'spheres' or aspects of policy-making 
may be characterised by different types of government-party 
relationships: one can therefore legitimately refer to situations 
of partial autonomy. None the less, it remains true that the whole 
space defined by the two dimensions is unlikely to be occupied: 
most real-world relationships will tend to remain within a 
triangle, of which one summit lies towards the autonomy end of the 
autonomy-dependence dimension while the other two correspond to 
the government-dominant and party-dominant ends of the 
interdependence dimension.
To the extent that governments can be plotted in the 
space which has just been defined, it becomes possible to describe 
the precise nature of the relationships which link them to 
supporting parties. Moreover, as these relationships are likely to 
vary over time from one government to another in a given country, 
such a mapping makes it possible to discover the character and 
extent of the changes which take place; it thus helps to assess 
whether there are different types of evolutions, a matter which 
has scarcely been explored so far: we do not know, for instance, 
whether, in countries with competitive party systems governments 
tend, over time, to depend more or to depend less on the parties 
which support them.
A comprehensive and accurate plotting of types of 
government-party relationships has another aim, however, which is 




























































































more or less autonomy between parties and governments as well as 
why dependence takes some forms rather than others. If it becomes 
possible to locate specific governments in the two-dimensional 
space of autonomy and dependence, it becomes also possible to 
relate certain types of links (or the absence of links) to 
particular characteristics of the political system. Furthermore, 
one can see to what extent a particular causal factor combines 
with another in some cases while it does not others: for instance, 
while government-party relationships are affected by the nature of 
the party system, this effect may be different when the broad 
institutional settings is parliamentary or when it is 
presidential.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. It is, first, to list 
the political factors which appear prima facie able to affect the 
relationship between governments and supporting parties; it is, 
second, to suggest some hypotheses about the ways in which 
government-party relationships may be affected by the intervention 
of these factors. The presentation is conceptual; it is no 
substitute for an empirical investigation which has to come but 
which should be helped by the categorisations resulting from this 
analysis.
The factors which affect government-party relationships 
fall into two broad groups. One group includes characteristics of 
the political system which concern the way decisions are processed 




























































































particular, these characteristics include, at one extreme, the 
national political institutions and, at the other, the part played 
by individual actors, and in particular by government leaders and 
by party leaders. In between, the configuration of the party 
system, on the one hand, and the characteristics of each of the 
parties supporting the government, on the other, obviously play a 
major part. The paper will therefore examine successively the 
effect (both separate and combined) on government-party 
relationships of the institutional framework, of the party system, 
of the structure, bases, and ideology of the parties supporting 
the government, and of the governmental and party leadership.
The second type of factors relates to the nature of the 
decisions which are to be taken. We noted earlier that party- 
government relationships are likely to vary over time: they can 
indeed vary from cabinet to cabinet because the characteristics of 
the supporting parties and of the leadership may also vary: but 
these relationships can also differ in character from one policy 
field to another: it was pointed out for instance in the paper 
referred to earlier that the role of parties did not seem to be 
the same with respect to foreign affairs as with respect to 
internal matters. Admittedly, this difference may not be due, or 
be due only to the substance of this distinction: it may be the 
result of the way decisions have to be taken in these two 
fields. What needs in any case to be explored is whether decisions 
taken in the various policy areas are characterised by different 




























































































whether there are, so to speak, kinds of more or less conscious 
trade-offs among the policy fields, whether, for instance, the 
government is the initiator in some fields while the party (or 
parties) are the initiators in others.
After having examined the part played by the structure of 
the political system and by the actors in shaping government-party 
relationships, this paper will therefore investigate the ways in 
which these relationships may vary according to policy fields. 
Throughout the analysis the three levels referred to earlier have 
to be taken into account, these levels being the composition of 
governments and of party elites, the distribution of favours and 
patronage, and, of course, policy-making and elaboration. Only a 
thorough investigation of all these elements can provide a 
comprehensive picture of the way in which and the extent to which 
the various factors which we are examining here play a part in 
shaping government-party relationships. Not surprisingly, such a 
comprehensive picture is likely to be complex rather than simple 
and blurred rather than clear-cut; in many cases, its 
characteristics will be contradictory rather than consistent.
The national institutional framework and its effect on government- 
party relationships
Let us turn first to the most general elements in the 
political system which are likely to affect the pattern of 




























































































institutions and specifically those which are defined and given 
authority by the constitution. Surprisingly perhaps at first 
sight, but in reality most logically, the effect of these national 
institutional arrangements is to reduce the impact of 
relationships between governments and parties and, at the limit, 
to weaken them so much that they become almost insignificant.
One of the main reasons why parties exist is in order to 
provide links between the people and the government; these links 
can have an upward direction if parties have primarily a 
representative character or have a downward direction if they 
have mainly a 'mobilising' character. This is to say that, where 
parties emerge from the people, so to speak, and are allowed to 
develop naturally and freely, they will attempt to supervise, and 
at the limit to control the government; on the other hand, parties 
may be set up and closely directed by an executive which attempts 
to strengthen its influence in the country. Yet, in both cases, as 
well as in (fairly common) intermediate situations, the outcome is 
the establishment of a close relationship between government and 
supporting parties. Thus, if constitutional and other national 
institutional arrangements do not 'interfere' with the process of 
government-party relationships, so to speak, the development of 
parties will coincide with a large amount of interdependence 
between government and supporting parties.
This is why the effect of national institutions on 




























































































reduction in the strength of the links which might have existed 
otherwise. National institutional arrangements, and especially 
constitutional arrangements, tend to give authority to the bodies 
which are set up through them. These bodies acquire as a result 
(or at least can be expected to acquire, if the national 
institutional arrangements are legitimate), enough influence to 
give their members and in particular their leaders the ability to 
act on their own, to an extent at least: those leaders then do not 
need the support of (or do not need much support from) other 
bodies to see their decisions accepted and ultimately implemented. 
Parties, may not be superfluous, but they are no longer a 
requirement. This is not the whole story, admittedly, as the 
leaders of each national institution will attempt to exercise 
influence on the leaders of other national institutions and may 
use supporting parties in order to do so. The game which is played 
is therefore the following: on the one hand, the national 
institutions establish various decision-making bodies and give 
authority to these bodies in order to enable them to exercise 
their powers; on the other, each of these bodies attempts to 
undermine the autonomy of other decision-making bodies and the 
party is one of the main means used to achieve this aim.
Naturally, the game will end to the advantage of a 
particular institution if the other institutions have little 
authority. In a more subtle manner, it will also end to the 
advantage of one institution if all the institutions set up by the 




























































































institution may be able to use the party to establish its 
dominance. Thus, in traditional 'constitutional' monarchies, such 
as Britain before the Reform Acts or Morocco after independence, 
the monarchy is the strongest institution, while the legislature 
is weak; moreover, the executive can exercise direct influence on 
the legislature: the party is typically the mechanism used by the 
executive to control the legislature. A similar trend can be found 
in 'authoritarian' or 'charismatic' presidential systems, which 
are the republican equivalent of traditional constitutional 
monarchies. In these cases, the party helps the president to curb 
the possible influence of other institutional bodies, and in 
particular the legislature.
The situation is different in 'constitutional' 
presidential systems: in these, government-party relationships are 
reduced in scope because the authority of both executive and 
legislature are strong while the sources of this authority are 
distinct. This is particularly the case in the United States, 
which is the only constitutional presidential system having lasted 
for long periods without a hiatus; but similar trends can be 
noticed in Latin American constitutional presidential 
systems. In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, since there 
is no strict separation between executive and legislature, a link 
has to develop but this link has to be informal: there is 
therefore greater scope for government-party relationships to be 
tight, the role of these relationships being in the first instance 




























































































Government-party relationships operate therefore in 
presidential systems under the following constraints: 1) there can 
be autonomy or interdependence but, if there is interdependence, 
the government, not the party, is the dominant element; 2) 
presidential dominance will tend to occur in authoritarian or 
charismatic presidential systems; 3) in 'constitutional' 
presidential systems, party and government tend to be autonomous 
from each other.
If there is autonomy between government and party, 
however, there is also a danger that the system will not function: 
in such a case, the executive is not in a position to use the 
party to curb the legislature or vice-versa. Deadlock will only be 
averted or overcome if one of three conditions is met. The first 
consists in tightening government-party relationships and in 
making the system function more like a parliamentary system or an 
authoritarian presidential system: this seems to occur in some 
constitutional presidential arrangements, for instance in Costa 
Rica or in Venezuela. The second solution consists in organising a 
vast system of compromises based on trade-offs which will result 
in the setting-up of different areas of dominance for the various 
actors; this solution is particularly likely to occur where the 
parties are markedly decentralised (and in particular in federal 
systems): in such a case, it becomes difficult to refer to a real 
or complete 'autonomy' of the actors; yet these are not 




























































































is a series of limited, but none the less important semi- 
autonomous spheres of action: such a situation corresponds broadly 
to that of the contemporary United States. The third solution is 
simply the end of this particular form of presidential rule, an 
outcome which has occurred periodically in competitive Latin 
American political systems; this is indeed why the dangers 
inherent in constitutional presidential systems are stressed in 
the literature (2).
We have discussed so far the possible effect on 
government-party relationships of constitutional and other 
arrangements at the central level of the State; these 
relationships are also affected by the vertical division of powers 
between centre and regions. The effect is to a large extent 
indirect, however, in that it affects primarily the distribution 
of power within the parties and, in this way, the ability of the 
party to influence the executive. Thus truly decentralised 
polities also display highly decentralised characteristics at the 
level of parties: this is the case of the United States, of 
Canada, of Switzerland; in those federal systems which are not 
truly decentralised, on the other hand, such as those of Austria, 
Argentina, or Venezuela, the structure of the political parties 
appears not to be markedly affected either by the constitutional 
arrangements: the effect of these arrangements on government-party 




























































































Where they have an effect, national institutional 
arrangements may affect government-party relationships at all 
three levels. They can affect policy-making in that, where the 
government is relatively autonomous from the party, that is to say 
primarily in constitutional presidential systems, the scope for
governmental initiatives is large , but such initiatives may also
be blocked since the party and the legislature are also
autonomous; in constitutional presidential systems. too, the
composition of the governmental and party elites is affected, as 
both the government and the parties are relatively free from each 
other's interference. On the contrary, in other forms of 
presidential systems and in parliamentary systems, both policy­
making and personnel composition are markedly affected by 
government-party relationships: in authoritarian presidential 
systems, the government dominates; in parliamentary systems, the 
situation varies and it depends largerly, as we shall see shortly, 
on the party system and on party characteristics. Finally, while 
government-party relationships tend to be manifest at the level of 
favours and advantages in most systems, they are particularly 
large in presidential systems as they seem to compensate for the 
lack of autonomy of the party (in the case of presidential systems 
of the authoritarian variety) and for the distance between 
government and party (in the case of presidential systems of the 
constitutional variety). The situation is more mixed in
parliamentary systems where, on this point too, the party system 




























































































National institutions thus play a part in establishing 
the setting within which government and parties relate to each 
other. By and large, they constitute primarily a force against the 
parties playing a large part rather than a force helping to 
streamline government-party relationships; this is partly because 
these national institutions have been set up, in Western countries 
at least, before parties became well-established, indeed at a time 
when parties were often regarded with considerable suspicion. 
Thus, while not disregarding the effect of national institutions 
on government-party relationships and indeed their strong (but 
negative) effect in the relatively exceptional case of 
constitutional presidential systems, we need to turn to party 
systems and to party characteristics to discover other important 
ways in which these relationships develop.
Party systems and their effect on government-party relationships
The effect of party systems on government-party 
relationships is large, but it is primarily indirect: it is not 
the party system as such which has an effect on the relationships, 
but the fact that the governmental structure and the decision­
making processes are likely to be affected by the existence of a 
given party system in the country. This indirect effect is 
particularly marked in systems which are both parliamentary and of 
more than one party as the impact of the characteristics of the 
party system is then fully felt, essentially because the 




























































































presidential systems and/or where there is a single party system, 
on the contrary, the effect is to an extent conditioned by the 
characteristics of the presidential system, as we saw in the 
previous section, or, as we shall see in the next section, it 
depends primarily on the internal characteristics of the parties, 
as single party systems vary markedly in structure, social base, 
and ideology.
However, although the main underlying element is 
constituted by the internal characteristics of the party in single 
party systems, these variations take place in the context of a 
high level of interdependence, for single party systems are 
typically set up in order to help strengthen the government's hold 
over the country. In most cases at least, the single party is 
conceived (or at least is conceived when it is set up) as having 
a mobilising character: its closeness to the government is 
therefore axiomatic; it may even be a euphemism to say that the 
party is close to the government, as there is likely to be full 
interpenetration between the two bodies.
Moreover, interpenetration does not mean reciprocal 
influence: on the whole, there is either marked government 
dominance (in the majority of cases) or marked party dominance (in 
a minority of situations). The first case corresponds to single 
party systems set up by powerful leaders, normally in the context 
of authoritarian presidential systems: the party is then the arm 




























































































systems are found in many Black African countries, for instance. 
For the party to be dominant, on the contrary, party structures 
have to be strong and to have been implanted by leaders anxious to 
establish the predominance of that party: this has been 
traditionally the case in most Communist countries, but almost 
exclusively in these countries, as only there has the party fully 
exercised the function of a 'transmission belt'. Changes which 
occurred in the late 1980s suggest that there may no longer be 
party dominance even in some of the States which remained 
Communist, and in particular in the Soviet Union.
In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, (as well as 
occasionally in constitutional presidential systems when there is 
close relationship between executive and supporting party, as in 
Costa Rica), differences among party systems have a direct impact 
on the party composition of governments and it is this difference 
in party composition which has in turn an effect on the 
relationship between governments and supporting parties. Subject 
to empirical verification, one can distinguish among three broad 
situations. In single party majority governments, typically to be 
found in two-party systems or in systems of more than two parties 
but where one party is dominant, as in Sweden and, in earlier 
decades, Norway as well as, outside Western Europe, for a long 
period at least, India, there is a close relationship between 
government and supporting party; this relationship seems to 
operate by and large to the benefit of the government and in 




























































































to stem primarily from the characteristics of parties and from the 
nature of the leadership: they will be examined in the coming 
sections. The case of a dominant partner in a coalition in which 
there is a dominant party is somewhat analogous, as German 
and French Fifth Republic examples indicate.
The second situation is that of the minority single party 
government and of the dominant party in a minority coalition 
dominated by one party, a situation which has occurred frequently 
in Denmark and occasionally in Norway. Relations between 
government and parties supporting the coalition are close, whether 
the parties are or not represented in the government: but there is 
no dominance by the executive and much of policy-making is on the 
basis of trade-offs. Paradoxically, the government may be more 
autonomous in terms of policy-making vis-a-vis the party or 
parties represented in the government than vis-a-vis the party or 
parties supporting it from outside, though these parties have of 
course no or very little impact on the composition of the 
government (3).
Third, in other types of coalitions, there is 
a high degree of party dominance, as can be seen by the cases of 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, as well as, for long periods at 
least, Austria. Variations in the extent of party dominance appear 





























































































Relations between governments and supporting parties take 
place, as we pointed out, at three levels, those of policy 
elaboration, of governmental and party elite composition, and of 
favours and patronage distribution: the effect of the party system 
on these relationships is not the same for the three types of 
situations which we have identified. At the level of policy- 
elaboration, single party majority governments and coalitions with 
a dominant party are characterised by a substantial amount of 
governmental influence, especially over time. A party comes to 
office with a programme, typically adopted by the party executive 
or the national conference; but the government retains some room 
for manoeuvre in interpreting the programme. Moreover, the 
government is likely to have gradually more influence; it is also 
likely to play a considerable part in the elaboration of the 
subsequent electoral programme. Governmental dominance in the 
policy field is thus substantial and tends to grow.
Both the impact and the evolution are similar with 
respect to the extent and direction of influence over the 
composition of the government and of the top party elite: 
originally, members of the government emerge from the party, and 
indeed from senior elements in the party: the party can thus be 
regarded as dominant at that point; but, first, the party leader 
typically exercise a substantial amount of discretion; second, he 
or she can normally also exercise some influence on appointments 
at the top of the party, though the extent of this influence 




























































































governmental and party elite membership, a fusion which, however, 
tends over time to work to the benefit of the government rather to 
that of the party elite. In parliamentary systems in which a 
single party has a majority, government leaders are more 
restricted in their choices than American presidents: there is no 
or very little autonomy from the party. There is an equilibrium, 
however, and this seems to turn over time to the advantage of the 
government, especially if that government survives one or more 
elections.
Finally, single party majority governments are probably 
characterised by and large by a relatively low level of 
distribution of favours and patronage: the cohesion of the party 
and the party character of the electoral contests make it 
unnecessary for the government and the top party leadership to 
place much emphasis on individual favours. Single party majority 
governments are thus on the whole government-led and the party's 
influence tends to become more restricted or more sporadic while 
governmental pressure increases over time. This creates discontent 
occasionally in the party, however: revolts may even lead to the 
fall of the government or at least of its leader.
Coalition systems have almost the opposite 
characteristics. The composition of the government is typically 
decided by the party while the government has at most very little 
say in the composition of the top party elite: ministers are often 




























































































transmitted to the new prime minister. Second, patronage 
is often widespread, though this may be further reinforced (or 
reduced) as a result of the specific power relationships within 
the coalition parties. By and large, however, coalition 
governments tend to need to - or wish to - provide benefits to 
many of their supporters at various levels. Finally, the coalition 
parties appear also to have a major influence on governmental 
policy. This influence is indeed often formalised by means of a 
governmental compact, often very detailed, by which the parties 
determine in advance the line which the government is to take on 
most, if not all, issues; none the less, governments probably 
always find 'holes' in the compact and thus at least elaborate 
some policies which the parties may subsequently endorse or on 
which they may choose to remain silent. Yet, by and large - and as 
much in a negative as in a positive sense (by not allowing the 
government to do things as much as by inducing it to act in a 
certain way), parties are influential in coalition arrangements.
The case of minority single party (or minority coalition) 
governments is intermediate. First, only the party (or parties) 
represented in the government play a part in determining the 
composition of that government: there is thus only partial party 
influence at this level. Second, with respect to policy 
elaboration, what begins by a substantial amount of party 
dominance (including by the parties supporting the government from 
outside) seems to be slowly replaced by some governmental 




























































































reminiscent of constitutional presidential systems: the government 
proposes some policies and discovers later whether there is 
support for these policies among the coalition partners. Party 
dominance appears therefore to be only partial: an 'arms length' 
situation prevails. Finally, the level of distribution of 
patronage and favours seems relatively low, in part because the 
position of the government is rather ambiguous vis-a-vis the 
supporting parties.
The single party majority, coalition, or minority 
character of the government has thus a considerable impact of the 
nature of the relationship between the government and the 
supporting parties: since governments are structured in this 
manner, in parliamentary systems at least, largely because of the 
party system, it seems therefore justified to claim that the party 
system has an important, even if indirect effect on government- 
party relationships. While single party governments can be 
expected to dominate or at least to lead political life, if not 
perhaps when the government is formed and during the early moments 
of its life, but at least later on, coalitions remain markedly 
under the tutelage of their 'godfathers', a tutelage which can be 
exercised in many cases at the three levels at which parties and 
governments interact. The somewhat shaky character of minority 
governments, on the other hand, places these only in parttial 
dependence and they may even display, for a while at least, a 





























































































Party structure and ideology and its impact on government-party 
relationships
Three aspects need to be taken into account in order to 
assess the internal characteristics of parties: these are the 
social base from which the party emerged, the structure of the 
party and its links with other bodies (trade unions for instance), 
and the ideology of the party. The most obvious impact is indeed 
that of the ideology, as parties of the Left are more likely to 
want to intervene in the life of the government which they support 
than parties of the Right: parties of the Left consider such an 
'interference' as a manifestation of 'democracy' and of 
participation. This impact manifests itself both with respect to 
the composition of the government and with respect to policy­
making; it is less apparent with respect to patronage and favours, 
as parties of the Left, which 'should' be against these, appear in 
fact often to need them to maintain the unity of the party: they 
may then justify these favours by suggesting that the faithful 
deserve to receive these rewards because of their work for the 
society. Yet, while the direction of the impact of ideology is 
clear, its real strength is not ostensibly very large, in Western 
Europe at least: this is perhaps because of the decrease in the 
ideological distance between the parties which are effective 
contenders for government membership.
Second, the social base of the party has an impact on




























































































parties which have an extensive social base from those which do 
not: the latter tend to be set up by leaders who wish to impose 
their rule on the nation; the former are composed on the one hand 
of the 'representative' parties on the Western model, and, on the 
other, of those authoritarian parties, and in particular those 
dominant single parties, which have extensive support in a part at 
least of the population: thus Communist parties did have an 
extensive social base in some of the countries which they ruled; 
so did some fascist parties.
It is difficult to assess the direction and the strength 
of the impact of an extensive social base on government-party 
relationships. Extensive authoritarian parties are set up in order 
to increase the dominant role of the leadership, but this can be 
the leadership of the party (in the case of many Communist 
parties) or of the government (extensive parties of the 
authoritarian Right). 'Representative' parties are likely to 
attempt to influence governments, on the whole; but the fact that 
they have a large social base does not automatically give them 
influence, as they may be so decentralised and indeed so divided 
that they are unable to affect the government as parties; it is 
elements in their midst which put pressure and may have influence: 
this is the case, for instance, with American parties. Thus when 
parties have a large social base, governments and parties are 
probably more interdependent than when the social base is limited; 
but the forms, characteristics, and even extent of this greater 




























































































have a large social base has probably as much of an effect on the 
amount of patronage distributed than on policy-making and even 
perhaps more than on the composition of the government.
The impact of the party structure on government-party 
relationships is profound, but complex: at the limit, as we noted 
in a previous paper, party structures can be regarded as being the 
main elements to be taken into consideration in order to 'define' 
parties (4): for party structures help to determine the extent of 
party cohesion. In theory at least, parties could be plotted along 
a dimension ranging from total unity to such divisions that there 
is an almost infinite number of decision-making centres.
At the 'cohesive' end of the dimension are those parties 
where decisions are taken primarily at the top, though there may 
be some consultation of the rank-and-file. Close to that end of 
the continuum are parties with two power centres, admittedly 
partly overlapping, these being the parliamentary group and the 
national executive.
Somewhat less cohesive parties are of two types, 
factionalised or geographically-divided. Party factions may be 
ideological or personalised; geographical divisions may be due to 
liguistic, ethnic, or religious minorities or to differences in 
the socio-economic characteristics of the areas concerned; they 
may also have a personalised element. In both factionhalised and 




























































































likely to be opposed by a substantial proportion of the local 
leaders; united party positions may not be adopted on some 
matters.
So long as the factional or geographical lines are clear- 
cut and therefore predictable, a degree of cohesion remains; 
compromises may be thrashed out and indeed respected, at least if 
the party wishes to appear to function as a decision-making unit. 
This is not the case at the other end of the dimension, as parties 
are then composed of large numbers of small groups taking 
different views on most issues: in such cases, coalitions then 
emerge haphazard and are extremely fragile. At the limit, the 
party ceases to exist in all but in name.
The effect of these differences in structure on 
government-party relationships is complex, as two movements have 
to be taken into account. On the one hand, the more cohesion the 
party displays, the more it is able to exercise influence as a 
party; but, on the other, the more the party displays cohesion, 
the more the government is able to influence the whole party by 
controlling the top of the organisation. Cohesion is thus a key 
issue in that only where it exists can one truly refer to 
influence and at the limit to dominance of either the party on the 
government or of the government on the party; but the other key 
issue is whether the government controls the central power 




























































































The answer to this second question is given, as we saw 
earlier, by the party system. Assuming party cohesion, where there 
is single party majority government, there will tend to be fusion 
between party and government and this situation turns to the 
benefit of the government; where there is single-party minority 
government or where there is a coalition government, this 
fusion does not exist: the main decision centre of the party 
remains outside the government and the party is the beneficiary.
At the other extreme of the range, where there is no 
party cohesion at all, there is no real opportunity for either 
party dominance or for government dominance. There is then 
autonomy for the government and for the party; indeed it is not so 
much the party as such which is autonomous, since this expression 
covers little reality in such a case; the autonomous agents are 
the party 'chieftains' who can exercise influence, often because 
they are members of the legislature. Such a situation has its 
dangers, not only because little policy-making is likely to be 
achieved, but because the composition and consequently the 
existence of the government may be continuously in question, as 
was the situation in the French Fourth Republic. The parliamentary 
system seems ineffective when parties have these characteristics: 
it ultimately collapses or it has to be streamlined. 
Constitutional presidential systems function better, as there is 
governmental autonomy at the level of the composition of the 





























































































If we move back in the direction of the cohesion end of 
the range, two positions on that dimension are particularly 
interesting. One is that of the party with well-defined factions: 
such a party can be regarded as constituting a coalition: what has 
been found to apply to coalitions also applies to these cases. 
Thus governmental composition is markedly influenced by the party 
while governmental policy-making is partly under party influence, 
although a substantial degree of governmental autonomy remains; 
patronage and favours are distributed on a large scale: the 
Italian Christian Democrats and the Japanese Liberal Democrats are 
examples of such situations. The other type of relatively cohesive 
party is that in which power is divided between the parliamentary 
group and the party in the country: if the two bodies are in 
agreement, there is no difficulty; but, if they are in conflict, 
the government will be under attack from one of them and will need 
support: in most cases this will come from the parliamentary group 
which will benefit from the situation and exercise as a result 
some influence on policy-making and, indirectly at least, on the 
composition of the government; favours and patronage are not 
extensive, as the cohesion of the party is high.
Internal party characteristics thus play a substantial 
part in determining whether government or party dominates the 
relationship between the two bodies, although these party 
characteristics have in most cases to be considered jointly with 
the party system, in the same way as the effect of the party 




























































































party characteristics, and in particular with the level of party 
cohesion. Thus, while it may be to the advantage of the government 
and of the party that the cohesion of the party be improved, such 
a cohesion can also mean that the one who gains from the improved 
cohesion may not be the one who pushes most strongly for it. In 
this respect in particular, the members of the political elite can 
have a large part to play: we need therefore to turn to that part 
to complete the picture of the general factors affecting 
government-party relationships.
The role of governmental and party leaders in strengthening 
government-party relationships
Major controversies have arisen and continue to arise 
about the role of leaders of other key actors in political life 
(6). These controversies are fuelled by the fact that, while the 
role of these actors appears ostensibly to be large, it is clearly 
also boosted or depressed by some, if not all, of the factors 
which we have described so far. Thus the presidential system, more 
than the parliamentary system, gives the chief executive the 
opportunity to lead the government in an autonomous manner; thus 
there is greater likelihood that a strong leader will emerge in 
single party government than in coalition government, where 
compromises and arbitration are the essential qualities required 
of the prime minister; thus, too, centralised parties with a high 
degree of cohesion are likely to have strong leaders while 




























































































to be regarded as being a separate factor in the determination of 
government-party relationships, it must be shown to have a part to 
play over and above the effect which the factors which we have 
just described may have on leadership.
Let us therefore examine what the impact of leaders on 
government-party relationships may be by considering the resources 
which these leaders may have in different situations. One can 
distinguish among three types of leaders, government leaders who 
are not party leaders, party leaders who are not government 
leaders, and leaders who are both government and party leaders. 
The first type can be found in a variety of situations, ranging 
from presidential chief executives who came to power on the basis 
of popular, rather than party support to heads of governments 
appointed by a president elected by popular vote (French prime 
ministers in the Fifth Republic, for instance) and to prime 
ministers in a coalition context. These leaders may have widely 
different resources, but they all have the same objective, namely 
to strengthen the role of the government over that of the party. 
They are therefore likely to stress one or both of two elements, 
the need for national cohesion and the managerial or technical 
role of the government. On both grounds, these leaders will 
attempt to move government-party relationships away from 
interdependence and in the direction of greater autonomy. The move 
is likely to be more successful in (constitutional) presidential 
systems than in parliamentary systems, but it will take place also 




























































































leadership of someone who is a government leader, but not a party 
leader, can be maximised.
Second, party leaders who are not government leaders 
naturally have the oppposite objective, namely to ensure that the 
interdependence between government and party is maximised and that 
this interdependence is exercised to the benefit of the party. A 
prerequisite is naturally that the party be cohesive: the first 
aim of such leaders is therefore to bring about cohesion to their 
organisation if this is lacking. Moreover, party leaders are also 
unlikely to be able to exercise strong influence over coalition 
governments dominated by a party whose leader is also leader of 
the government, especially if this party has great cohesion. The 
most favourable situation for these party leaders is therefore 
that of a coalition government composed of parties which are 
relatively equal and none of whose leaders are in the government; 
but there are also favourable opportunities for such leaders when 
the dominant party is not cohesive.
Party leaders exercise their influence indirectly, 
largely through the ministers of their party whose appointments 
they typically control. Policy matters may thus come to be removed 
from the governmental area and sent to the party leaders for 
adjudication. There are limits to the influence of party leaders 
in these coalition situations, however, these limits being 
provided by the leaders of the other coalition parties. The leader 




























































































The power of party leaders in coalition situations rests 
ultimately on manipulation and on the threat to bring down the 
government, a threat which can only be used sparingly if it is to 
have an effect, however.
Third, those who are both government and party leaders 
appear naturally prima facie to have the greatest resources, since 
they can in principle use party influence and yet also take a 
'national' posture. This situation tends to occur in single party 
governments: but leaders can exploit this situation more or less. 
Indeed, they have the choice between two options: they can push 
government-party relationships in the direction of governmental 
dominance, though this may lead to discontent in the party; 
alternatively, they can attempt to realise an equilibrium between 
party and government by balancing the 'political' demands of the 
party against the 'technical' demands of the government. This 
strategy is almost certainly the most effective in the long run, 
the effect of such an action being to move government-party 
relationships towards a position of interdependence.
Moreover, the question needs to be examined in a 
time dimension, since leadership grows and decays, although the 
conditions of this growth and decay are not well documented, let 
alone measured. It is not certain that 'new' leaders are stronger 
than old leaders (7); in particular, it is not certain that new 
leaders can easily shrug off, during their first years in office, 




























































































exercise on governmental composition. It seems on the contrary 
that government leaders may be able to grow and to acquire more 
autonomy or more influence on party policies and on the 
composition of the party elite. This does not always occur, 
admittedly; moreover, leaders come to experience decline after a 
number of years in office, although the exact shape of the curve 
is not known, largely because the matter has remained so far 
almost wholly unexplored.
Government leaders who are not party leaders benefit most 
if they can move government-party relationships towards some 
greater degree of autonomy; those who are party leaders without 
being government leaders benefit most if they succeed in 
strengthening the dependence of the government; and those who are 
both government and party leaders would seem to have a more secure 
position if they can establish a degree of interdependence between 
government and parties. Yet leaders may not be able to achieve 
these goals, even after a period, let alone immediately. Thus 
leaders seem able to play a significant part in determining the 
shape of government-party relationships. It might not be possible 
to measure the precise extent of their influence, but the 
examination of a number of cases should at least begin to provide 





























































































Policy fields and government-party relationships
So far, we looked at government-party relationships in 
bulk rather than in detail: yet one needs to go beyond general 
assessments and examine specific policies, for parties may not be 
able or willing to 'interfere' to the same extent with respect to 
all fields of government: in foreign affairs, for instance, party 
intervention is reltatively rare. Governments may therefore have 
to be regarded as more or less autonomous, depending on the types 
of policies in which they are engaged.
It seems indeed ostensibly true that governments are less 
subjected to party pressure in some fields than in others: what is 
not clear, however, is whether this is a matter of the fields 
themselves or is primarily due to differences in process and 
chaacteristics of the decision. Ostensibly at least, what seems 
important is whether a problem is highly controversial politically 
or not, for instance. Thus, in the case of foreign affairs, issues 
related to the European Community have been hotly debated in most 
Western European parties; the same has been true, in some 
countries at least and in particular in Britain, of issues related 
to nuclear disarmament.
The root of the problem seems to stem from the fact that 
governments and parties have a different raison d'etre. 
Governments have to 'run the country'; they have to ensure that 




























































































elaboration of new policies takes place in a context in which 
'ordinary' administration tends to crowd innovations out. Parties, 
on the other hand, at least if they have independent views on 
policies (and 'mobilising' parties often do not have such views 
since they are typically dependent on the government), have 
intrinsically different priorities from those of governments. Far 
from being concerned with general administration, they are mostly 
interested in policies at the most general levels and at the 
individual level: they attempt to innovate, on the one hand and, 
on the other, they take up grievances from members or want to 
distribute favours. Moreover, while governments are often 
concerned with rather technical issues, parties are concerned 
primarily with broad political and social matters. Finally, while 
governments have often to take quick decisions, parties tend to 
have slow decision making procedures.
These fundamental differences in the activities of 
governments and parties explain why there may be conflicts between 
the two types of bodies; they explain also why there may be a 
substantial area of autonomy of governments. Specifically, 
governments are markedly involved in three types of situations 
in which parties are on the contrary often reluctant to be 
involved. One of these situations is represneted by emergencies. 
These take much of time and energy of government, often in foreign 
affairs, but also in home affairs, for instance in the economic 
field. Parties are usually reluctant or are unable to be involved, 




























































































situations, they are satisfied to make general statements and 
leave the government to decide.
Second, much of what the government does has a technical 
character, as we said: parties are ill-equipped to deal with these 
matters which are also sometimes regarded by parties as excuses 
used by governments to undermine or even subvert the objectives 
which these parties wish to achieve. Yet technical considerations 
run across a wide range of governmental affairs, although they are 
primarily dominant in the fields of foreign affairs and economics, 
while being also important in those aspects of social policy in 
which legal considerations are central. This correspondingly tends 
to reduce the area in which parties truly exercise influence.
Third, governments are concerned with questions which are 
either politically non-controversial or which cut across party 
positions. This is especially the case with matter of 
implementation. These issues may be regarded as secondary by 
parties; yet they do occupy much of the time of ministers and 
obviously cannot be left aside. Administrative matters are, as we 
indicated earlier, the stuff of government: parties know that 
governments are there to run the bureaucracy and they indeed 
complain if civil servants appear to be in control; yet political 
control cannot be achieved unless ministers are immersed in 
administrative life. These are therefore able to acquire some 
autonomy at this level by default, though on this, too, parties 




























































































The extent of autonomy or of interdependence is thus 
likely to vary markedly according to different types of 
governmental activities, if not perhaps specifically according to 
governmental fields. Party involvement in policy development will 
therefore range from strongly pressed for initiatives to a total 
absence of reaction. At one end of the dimension are the policy 
proposals which are presented in the party electoral programme, 
provided these proposals are truly drafted by the party and not 
inserted by the government in the first instance: initiatives 
which are strongly pressed for by the parties are the true means 
by which parties attempt to ensure that the government acts on 
their behalf. These initiatives stand alongside measures which the 
party may have mentioned, but without much enthusiasm, alongside 
measures which the government proposes and the party endorses or 
at least does not object to, and, at the extreme end of the range, 
alongside measures on which the party has no opinion. Almost 
certainly, matters concerned with emergencies, technical matters, 
and matters which are politically non-controversial or which cut 
across party lines fall within this last category. Thus, between 
the policy fields or problems where parties and governments truly 
intersect and those where the government is autonomous, there is a 
substantial area of 'semi-autonomy' in which the government can 
act in large part because parties are not organised to be involved 





























































































The factors affecting government-party relationships are 
complex and interlocking. Parties have been set up, in many 
Western countries at least, to ensure that governments implement 
programmes which the people is presumed to prefer. In the course 
of the development of 'party government', not only have there been 
parties which were unwilling to bring about change, but 
governments have also been involved in many activities in which 
parties could not be or did not wish to be truly concerned. 
Naturally enough, the desire to see parties exercising real 
pressure on governments persists, since this is a requirement if 
representative government is to be achieved; but one needs also to 
discover in what ways and on what matters party pressure on 
government can be most effective as well as the areas in which 
this pressure is unlikely to play a large part. Systematic 
empirical inquiries are therefore needed in order to find out the 
role of the factors which have been described here. A better 
understanding of the different situations which will result from 
these inquiries will then help to throw light on the extent to 
which 'party government' truly exists and on the extent to which, 





























































































1. See the paper entitled 'A Model for the Analysis of 
Government-Party Relationships'.
2. See for instance J. Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism', 
Journal of Democracy, Winter 1990, pp. 51-69.
3. See in particular K. Strom, 'Deferred Gratification and 
Minority Governments in Scandinavia', Legislative Studies 
Quarterly, (11), 4, November 1986, pp. 583-605.
4. See the paper entitled 'Governments and Supporting Parties: 
Distinctions and Definitions'.
5. The ministerial personnel may have a very high turnover in 
presidential systems: this was the case for instance in Chile 
between 1945 and 1973.
6. For a summary of these controversies, see my Political 
Leadership (1986), London and Los Angeles: Sage, passim.
7. The particular strength of new leaders was stressed by V. 
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